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Abstract. Against premature claims about the declining political relevance of social class in post-industrial
democracies, recent research indicates that class continues to be a relevant determinant of political preferences.
In post-industrial societies ‘old’ class divides on economic issues coexist with ‘new’ class alignments on cultural
topics. While there is cumulated evidence of social classes’ distinct placement on these issues, this paper argues
that the strength of class divides depends on the extent to which these issues are politicized by political parties.
Studying preferences on economic and cultural issues (attitudes towards redistribution, immigration, gay rights
and European integration), this study shows that class divides in preferences are context dependent. The multilevel
analyses drawing on data from the European Social Survey and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey for 27 European
democracies demonstrate that classes’ differences in preferences are accentuated on issues strongly contested and
emphasized by parties, and mitigated on issues where party conflict is weaker. Adding to recent literature on parties
and class conflict, this study identifies another stage at which parties can affect the strength of class voting. The
varying strength of class divides across contexts also has implications for parties’ ability to garner support beyond a
single class. This becomes increasingly unlikely in contexts of high issue politicization.
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Introduction
The class cleavage was central in structuring political conflict in industrialized democracies for
much of the 20th century. While its relevance was hotly disputed in the 1990s (Clark et al. 1993),
recent accounts of class voting have overcome this debate, and have focused instead on identifying
new class-party alignments in post-industrial societies (Oesch & Rennwald 2018). By now, there is
cumulative evidence that class still serves as a site of preference formation, and that classes’ policy
preferences differ on more than one dimension of political conflict (Häusermann & Kriesi 2015;
Kitschelt & Rehm 2014; Oesch 2008). In addition to the traditional economic division around the
role of the state in the economy, social classes hold distinct positions on issues referring to civil
liberties, environmental protection, alternative lifestyles, or immigration. Recent studies of class
voting have also highlighted the role played by political parties in activating or mitigating the
strength of class voting (Evans & De Graaf 2013b; Evans & Tilley 2012b, 2017). According to
this line of research, the link between class and voting hinges crucially on the interaction between
the supply and demand side of electoral politics. Class differences become manifest in differential
patterns of voting only when political parties present distinct policy alternatives that appeal to
different classes (Evans & De Graaf 2013a).
In this paper, I combine the theoretical contributions from these demand- and supply-side
studies of class voting with recent findings in political psychology highlighting parties’ influence
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on attitude formation (e.g., Leeper & Slothuus 2014; Petersen et al. 2010; Slothuus & Bisgaard
2020) to assess how the supply side moderates the link between social class and issue preferences.
Moreover, I characterize the partisan supply by bringing in the concept of politicization, which
captures the intensity and visibility of conflict between parties (Hooghe & Marks 2012; Hutter &
Grande 2014). Specifically, I show how the strength of the relationship between social class and
policy preferences on different issues is moderated by the extent to which parties politicize these
same issues. My main argument is that class differences in preferences will be greater in contexts
in which the intensity of issue conflict between parties is higher. The empirical analyses combining
individual-level data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and party-level data from the Chapel
Hill Expert Survey (CHES) on 27 European countries provide support for this expectation. For
three of the four policy issues considered, class divides in preferences are greater where these
issues are highly politicized. The results of this study highlight the important role that parties play
in strengthening or mitigating class opposition on different topics.
This study makes two key contributions to current accounts of class voting, electoral
realignment and party conflict in post-industrial societies. First, it emphasizes the importance of
political parties in strengthening or mitigating class voting, beyond what was proposed in previous
research. While earlier studies tended to take classes’ issue preferences as purely ‘social’ – that
is, a consequence of structural position – this article argues that class differences in preferences
are also political, in that they are dependent on the characteristics of party conflict. Crucially, this
paper identifies another stage at which political parties can alter the importance of class in politics:
in the articulation of class divides in policy preferences, which can later guide differential patterns
of electoral behaviour. Parties can attenuate or strengthen class divisions in public opinion by
making issues less or more politically contentious. As a second contribution, by assessing classes’
issue positions across different political contexts, this study provides relevant information about
which social classes are likely to be mobilized jointly on a policy platform. Depending on the
context of politicization, parties will be more or less likely to garner electoral support across class
borders.
Since the analyses are based on cross-sectional survey data, they face certain limitations in
their ability to isolate the causal effect of parties’ politicization of issues on the relationship
between social class and individuals’ placement on these issues. The theoretical argument guiding
this study proposes that it is the configuration of the electoral supply that affects the importance
of social class for opinion formation. Yet, the moderating role of issue politicization by parties
manifest in the analyses could also be due to party positions responding to class divisions in public
opinion, or to both parties’ and classes’ responding to other factors. This study implements a series
of robustness checks to address this limitation by, for example, taking lagged values of parties’
positions and introducing different controls at the country-year level. The results are robust to
these alternative specifications. Moreover, these findings should be read in the context of recent
literature emphasizing that parties have agency in how they strategically position themselves on
issues relative to other competitors (Abou-Chadi et al. 2020), and that their policy stances do affect
public opinion (Slothuus & Bisgaard 2020). However, as other research in this area, these results
have to be considered in light of the limitations imposed by the nature of the data available. In the
final discussion I reflect on how future research might causally test the relationship uncovered in
this article.
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Social classes’ issue preferences in a multi-dimensional conflict space
Analyses of class voting in post-industrial democracies have adapted to two major transformations:
the expansion of new occupations, and the salience of new issues of party conflict. The
tertiarization and upgrading of the occupational structure have increased its heterogeneity, thus
making it necessary to implement more detailed measures of social class, better suited for this new
productive structure (Güveli 2006; Oesch 2006). This study implements a market-based definition
of social class that divides class locations according to the structural position that individuals
occupy in the labour market and production units (Breen 2005; Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992).
This means that classes are based on individuals’ market condition and occupational profile, with
class divisions capturing how the labour market stratifies individuals’ life chances. This definition
purposely excludes subjective aspects such as class consciousness or collective action. Social
classes are socioeconomic groups that occupy a similar position in the job structure, who – as a
consequence of this position – share similar economic prospects (e.g., future earnings, employment
security or prospects for upward mobility). This definition of class underlies influential class
schemes like Erikson, Goldthorpe & Portocarero’s (EGP) (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992) or Oesch’s
(2006).
Recent class schemes – most notably, Oesch’s (2006) – have accounted for the occupational
heterogeneity inherent to post-industrial economies. One of the key contributions of new schemes
has been to divide social classes based on differences in the nature of the work carried out
across occupations (their ‘work logic’). This dimension captures the different experiences and
relationships established in the workplace, which serves as a site of socialization and preference
formation (Ares 2020; Kitschelt & Rehm 2014). The work logic has become particularly important
to distinguish among professional occupations previously aggregated into a single (service)
class. Different class schemes have introduced new divisions separating sociocultural professions
(in health care, education, social welfare and the media) from managers, and professionals
in technical occupations (Güveli et al. 2007; Oesch 2006). In comparison to managers and
technical professionals, individuals in sociocultural occupations are more likely to favour a
stronger role of the state in the economy and more income redistribution (Gingrich & Häusermann
2015). Sociocultural professionals also hold particularly culturally liberal preferences (e.g., more
favourable to immigration or alternative lifestyles). The nature of their work – which puts them
in frequent interaction with other people’s needs, and makes use of social and cultural knowledge
– fosters values and attitudes associated with these culturally libertarian positions (Oesch 2006;
Güveli 2006).
Among the low-skilled occupations, the literature has mostly focused on the electoral behaviour
of production workers and small business owners, because of their realignment with radical right
parties (Arzheimer 2013; Bornschier & Kriesi 2013). Both social classes tend to hold markedly
authoritarian attitudes: they are generally opposed to immigration, put a higher emphasis on social
order, defend traditional gender roles, and oppose supranational integration (Häusermann & Kriesi
2015; Kitschelt & Rehm 2014). These two classes do, however, differ on their placement on
economic issues. While workers still constitute the class with highest support for state intervention
in the economy and income redistribution, small business owners are more favourable towards
free-market solutions (Houtman et al. 2008).
Within Oesch’s class scheme, there are a few social classes that illustrate very well patterns
of post-industrial realignment.1 Professionals in sociocultural occupations and the manufacturing
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working class represent paradigmatic examples of electoral realignment (Gingrich & Häusermann
2015; Güveli et al. 2007; Houtman et al. 2008). Sociocultural professionals have recently become
the new core electorate of the left, while other professionals in managerial occupations, as well
as large employers have remained the electoral preserve of the centre-right. Production workers
and small business owners, on the other hand, represent two social groups increasingly contested
by the radical right. A class that has received less attention, in spite of its increasing relevance in
service economies, are low-skilled service workers (Ares 2017). While we do not know much about
their preferences, it has been frequently assumed that they are close to sociocultural professionals.
Because of the large body of evidence gathered around the policy preferences of these specific
classes, and because they occupy different poles on the cultural and economic dimensions of
conflict, it is particularly relevant to address how their preferences depend on the configuration of
the partisan supply. Moreover, their placement on economic and cultural issues across contexts has
relevant implications for potential class-party alignments. The diversification of the occupational
structure, and the rising competition on cultural issues has led political parties to seek support
beyond their traditional social-class electorates. Electoral success appears increasingly dependent
on mobilizing voters’ support across class lines (i.e., building cross-class voter coalitions). The
potential for this cross-class mobilization is likely to depend on the similarity in policy preferences
of different social groups, which I expect to vary across contexts of politicization.
The politicization of issues by parties
In comparison to the frequent focus on demand-side politics to explain new patterns of class-
party alignments, fewer studies have addressed the importance of the electoral supply side in this
process. Moreover, the ones that have done so, have mainly studied the relationship between social
class and electoral behaviour, without considering the role played by parties in shaping public
opinion. Following arguments about the role of political actors in activating or reinforcing conflict
(Sartori 1969), this research attributed cross-national and temporal variation in the strength of class
voting to the extent to which parties present clear alternatives to voters (Elff 2007; Evans & De
Graaf 2013a; Evans & Tilley 2012a, 2017; Rennwald & Evans 2014). When there is variation
in parties’ programmatic positions, distinct preferences between social groups can be manifested
through the vote. If, on the contrary, parties do not offer real alternatives, class differences are
not reflected in party choice. Many of these studies focused primarily on the left-right ideological
differentiation of the electoral supply. However, disparity in parties’ stances on sociocultural issues
was not as frequently associated to class voting, even though these issues have become increasingly
salient (for an exception, see Goldberg & Sciarini 2014).
While these studies addressed the moderating role of the supply side on the class-party link in
the vote, we know very little about the consequences of parties’ stances for class distinctiveness
in policy preferences. Divisions in public opinion are relevant since they can be considered a pre-
condition for class voting. If social class does not play a role in the articulation of preferences,
then there are few differences in opinion to be expressed through the vote. I propose that the
configuration of the electoral supply moderates the strength of class opposition on policy issues.
Class opposition refers to individuals in different social classes taking different, antagonizing
positions on a specific issue. Hence, its meaning is restricted to a disparity in preferences between
classes, independently of whether and how this disparity is manifested in the vote. As the literature
in political psychology has indicated, political parties are relevant actors in the process of public
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opinion formation. While material interests, group affiliations or values can be key determinants
of voters’ attitudes, whether and how these predispositions are translated into specific preferences
(e.g. on public policy) is not an automatic process, and it hinges crucially on the political context
(Leeper & Slothuus 2014; Zaller 1992).
Opinion formation on specific issues is a cognitively demanding process that can be facilitated
by cues and heuristics. The articulation of policy preferences places high demands on voters in
terms of skills, resources and motivation. In this process, parties’ issue positioning frequently
serves as a heuristic, reducing the costs of information and providing cues to voters about which
issues are contested and how these issues relate to their interests (Leeper & Slothuus 2014;
Pannico 2017). Hence, the political context of party competition can alter the amount and types
of information available to voters (Cavaille & Neundorf 2015, 2016). In polarized contexts, the
clarity of the cues that voters receive is higher due to the bigger distance between parties and
the greater homogeneity in their messages, hence aiding voters in developing more consistent
attitudes (Levendusky 2010). Moreover, more information and cues are available on issues that
are relatively more salient for party competition. A growing body of literature has documented the
effect of the context of competition and, specifically, of parties’ role in this process, on opinion
formation. Political parties can shape public opinion on specific (and controversial) policy issues
(e.g., Broockman & Butler 2017; Minozzi et al. 2015), and party leaders’ stances on a specific
policy can polarize attitudes among all citizens (Nicholson 2012). Even on policies with high
stakes (like unemployment insurance and early retirement) citizens’ opinions shift in response to
changes in parties’ issue positions (Slothuus & Bisgaard 2020).
The amount of information and the clarity of parties’ positions available in contexts of high
politicization should operate on the relationship between social class and issue preferences.
Implicit in most understandings of class voting is the assumption that common economic life
chances and occupational experiences shape policy preferences, and that these guide electoral
behaviour. Yet, given that opinion formation is a demanding process, the influence of class location
and work experience on interests and preferences may not be automatic. Whether and how this
connection occurs is likely to depend on how issues are framed in the political debate (Kinder
1998). Political parties have a crucial role in structuring alternatives and connecting different
choice options to individuals’ predispositions (based on social class or other factors) (Petersen
et al. 2010). When policy issues become highly contentious between parties, this should raise the
awareness on class-related interests among voters. Salient contestation between political parties
increases the information available to voters, and facilitates that they connect particular values
with policy positions (Petersen et al. 2010). This is why the politicization of issues – understood
as combination of the intensity and visibility of conflict (Hutter & Grande 2014) – can be central
in strengthening or mitigating class divides in issue preferences.
Having outlined the importance of the political context for opinion formation and class divides,
a relevant question is to what extent parties are responsible for politicizing issues. As recent
literature on issue competition has indicated (Abou-Chadi et al. 2020; Meguid 2005), even if
parties’ strategies are constrained by social and economic transformations, they are not just victims
of structural conditions but are also agents of their own fate. Addressing party competition on
different issues beyond the left-right ideological conflict, this literature contends that the stances
that parties take on issues, and the visibility they attribute to them, partly responds to their
strategic choices. Some parties, frequently niche parties, might choose to strategically politicize
to their advantage issues which were previously not central to party competition (e.g., green
© 2021 The Authors. European Journal of Political Research published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of European Consortium for Political Research
6 MACARENA ARES
parties emphasizing environmentalism). In turn, other parties retain agency on how they react
to these challenges, by taking an accommodative, adversarial or dismissive strategy, with direct
implications for the politicization of niche parties’ main issues (Meguid 2005). If established
parties expect to benefit from a new issue, like European integration, they have an incentive to
take a stance and politicize it (Abou-Chadi 2016). These studies have demonstrated that parties
compete not only spatially (i.e., taking different positions) but also on the emphasis placed on
different topics. The strategic interaction between parties affects the contentiousness of different
topics (Abou-Chadi 2016; Abou-Chadi & Krause 2020). Moreover, since parties do not necessarily
compete on all issues in every election, this generates variation in issue politicization across space
and time.
Given these insights from political psychology and issue competition scholarship, I hypothesize
that in contexts where an issue is strongly politicized by parties, class differences in preferences
on that issue will be greater. In response to the structure of competition and their own strategic
considerations, parties provide information and heuristics to voters by mentioning an issue
frequently and by taking a clear stance on it. These are two key dimensions of the concept of
politicization: conflict visibility and intensity (Hutter & Grande 2014)2. The first, conflict visibility,
refers to the salience of conflict over an issue. Salience is usually considered as the key – almost
necessary – dimension of politicization, since the frequent presence of a topic in the public debate
is seen as a prerequisite for an issue to be politicized (Green-Pedersen 2012). A topic that is
minimally mentioned can hardly be made contentious. The second dimension, the intensity of
conflict, refers to actors’ polarization around a given issue. For a topic to be controversial, actors
need to take diversified and opposing positions on it. Both dimensions of politicization should be
central for the strength of class opposition. If parties hold distant positions on an issue, but it is
barely salient in the political debate, these positions are hardly visible for voters. If an issue is
highly salient but parties’ positions on it converge, voters do not receive contrasting messages.
Hence, the main hypothesis is that class divides in issue preferences will be greater in contexts
where these issues are strongly politicized by parties. In contexts of low politicization of an issue
the distinctiveness of social classes’ placement should be comparatively lower.
Data and Methods
To assess whether the strength of the association between social class and issue preferences is
moderated by parties’ politicization of these issues, this paper combines individual-level data from
rounds three to eight of the ESS (European Social Survey Round 3–8 Data 2006-2012), with party-
level data from the 2006, 2010 and 2014 CHES (Bakker et al. 2015). This provides a sufficiently
large number of level-2 observations (country-round) to be able to estimate multilevel models with
cross-level interactive terms.3
Because there is some disagreement about the dimensionality of political conflict in Europe and
because party competition can differ across specific issues, I study individuals’ issue preferences
separately. The estimations are based on four different outcome variables capturing (i) preferences
about income redistribution (with higher values indicating opposition to income redistribution by
the government); (ii) preferences on immigration – an index measure based on six individual items
gauging preferences on immigration with higher values indicating support for immigration4; (iii)
attitudes towards homosexuality (with higher values indicating more positive attitudes); and (iv)
preferences over European integration (with higher values gauging support for European Union
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[EU] integration). These items are included consistently in the ESS rounds under consideration.5
These measures of preferences have been standardized (to have a mean of 0 and a standard
deviation of 1) to allow for comparability across models. A detailed description of all variables
is available in Supporting Information Appendix 2.
To evaluate the potential moderation by the electoral supply, I compute a measure of
politicization on these same issues. In the CHES dataset there are four items that match the
ESS questions measuring individual preferences. On redistribution, the CHES asks about a party’s
“position on redistribution from the rich to the poor”. On immigration, there is information on the
“position on immigration policy”. On attitudes towards homosexuality, there is an item gauging
a party’s “position on social lifestyle (e.g. homosexuality)”. Last, on European integration, it asks
about the “orientation of the party leadership towards European integration”. Besides placing
parties on these issues, experts are also asked to indicate the salience attributed to each of them by
each party.6
The party-level data is used to operationalize politicization by partially following the proposal
by Hutter and Grande (2014), which captures both the intensity and visibility of conflict.
Politicization takes the product of the standard deviation of parties’ positions on an issue (as a
measure of actor polarization – the intensity of conflict) and the relative salience of that issue (as
a measure of conflict visibility). The relative salience of an issue takes the ratio of the average
salience of that issue (across parties) and the average salience of all issues within a party system.
Only parties with parliamentary representation are taken into consideration. As an example, in
the CHES from 2006, in Belgium, the standard deviation of parties’ positions on the issue of
redistribution takes the value 1.906. In this party system, the average salience of the issue of
redistribution across all parties is of 5.802 (with salience measured on a 0 to 10 scale), while
the average salience of all issues is of 5.578.7 The ratio of the two values is 1.040, indicating
that redistribution is relatively more salient than other issues. For this country, the measure of
politicization of redistribution takes the value of 1.982: the product of 1.906 times 1.040 (the
intensity and visibility of conflict). To facilitate the comparison of results across issues, the measure
of politicization is later rescaled to range from 0 to 1 (from the minimum to the maximum level
of politicization observed in the sample). While I expect both the visibility and intensity of party
conflict to impact jointly the process of opinion formation, as part of the robustness checks, I also
address the relevance of salience and polarization separately, to account for the possibility that it
is mostly one of these two dimensions that fosters attitudinal opposition between classes.
The figures in Supporting Information Appendix 4 present levels of politicization of the
different issues (in the original scale) across countries and time. The issues of redistribution and
immigration appear, on average, more politicized than the topics of gay and lesbian rights, or
European integration. More importantly, there are no obvious temporal or geographical clusters in
the distribution of politicization of these issues. Even on the topic of gay and lesbians’ rights –
on which we might have expected recent attitudinal shifts towards greater liberalization (Caughey
et al. 2019) to possibly hinder opposition on this issue – we find high levels of politicization in
more recent waves, and both in Western and Eastern Europe. This could be related to the active
opposition to gay rights among some radical right parties (e.g., VOX or the AfD) (Arzheimer 2015;
Turnbull-Dugarte 2019).
The other key explanatory variable in the analyses is social class. The operationalization
follows Oesch’s eight-class scheme, which assigns respondents to classes based on their
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occupation. This operationalization allows identifying some typical post-industrial classes (like
sociocultural professionals, or service workers) that are not well-captured in other schemes.
One might raise the concern that these horizontal divisions based on work logic might capture
not only the formation of political preferences in the context of the occupation but also
selection effects related to values (Kitschelt & Rehm 2014). These could, in turn, be associated
to different preferences, particularly on cultural issues (Stubager 2008). For this reason, I
repeat the analyses implementing the (six-class) EGP scheme in the robustness checks. This
alternative operationalization leads to the same conclusions. In the main analyses, I rely on
Oesch’s measure because it provides a clearer picture of some of the key class divides in post-
industrial societies highlighted in the theory section. The presentation of the results focuses
particularly on five social classes in the scheme for which there are clear expectations about their
placement on different issues. The figures summarize the results for sociocultural professionals,
managers, small business owners, production workers and service workers. While managers and
production workers frequently represent opposite poles on the economic dimension, sociocultural
professionals, and production workers and small business owners usually stand on opposite sides
on cultural issues. Service workers are included since they are frequently assumed as close to
sociocultural professionals, but evidence on their preferences is scarce. The tables included in
Supporting Information Appendices 5 and 6 present the results for the entire class scheme.
To estimate interaction coefficients between social class (measured at the individual level) and
politicization (measured at the country-round level) I rely on linear multilevel models with cross-
level interactions, which include random slopes for social class. All analyses introduce additional
controls for: atypical employment (i.e., labour market outsider status), educational attainment,
union membership, gender and age.8
Results
Before going into whether the political context moderates class divides, Figure 1 presents social
classes’ average placement on the four issues under consideration. These estimates are average
predicted values based on multilevel additive models controlling for the politicization of the
corresponding issue at the country-round level. The results here presented replicate established
findings from earlier research. On income redistribution – with higher values indicating opposition
to redistribution by the government – workers and the managerial class stand on opposing poles.
There is also a visible division among professionals, with sociocultural professionals being clearly
more supportive of state intervention. While workers and sociocultural professionals appear
relatively close on this topic, they are located on opposing poles on issues of the cultural domain.
On the topics of immigration, homosexuals’ rights and EU integration, production and service
workers tend to be located on the authoritarian and nationalistic pole, while the professional classes
appear as more libertarian and cosmopolitan. In line with studies of radical right support, small
business owners also appear as more culturally conservative. The main question in this paper,
however, is whether these differences are strengthened or mitigated depending on the configuration
of the partisan supply.
Figure 2 summarizes social classes’ average predicted preferences on redistribution, across
different levels of politicization of this issue. Politicization is rescaled to range from 0 to 1 – with
0 corresponding to the minimum politicization observed in the sample, and 1 to the maximum.
The estimates are based on a multilevel linear model with a cross-level interaction between
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Figure 1. Social classes’ average predicted preferences.
Note: Estimates are based on linear multilevel additive regression models introducing controls for age, gender,
education, union membership and politicization of issues (with random intercepts for country-round). The
coefficients for all variables are presented in models 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Supporting Information Appendix 5.
Figure 2. Average predicted preferences on redistribution along politicization of this issue. [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: Estimates from a linear multilevel interactive regression model (with random slopes for social class and
random intercepts for country-round) introducing controls for age, gender, education and union membership. The
coefficients for all variables are presented in model 5 of Supporting Information Appendix 6.
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Figure 3. Average predicted preferences on immigration along politicization of this issue. [Colour figure can be
viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: Estimates from a linear multilevel interactive regression model (with random slopes for social class and
random intercepts for country-round) introducing controls for age, gender, education and union membership. The
coefficients for all variables are presented in model 6 of Supporting Information Appendix 6.
social class and the politicization of redistribution, including random slopes for social class and
random intercepts for country-round.9 Higher values on the Y-axis indicate stronger opposition
to income redistribution by the government. Across all levels of politicization, production workers
consistently appear as the class most favourable to income redistribution, while managers and small
business owners locate themselves on the opposite pole. In line with the expected moderation
from the supply side, the preferences of the different social classes are spread further apart at
higher levels of politicization. Class divides are greater in contexts in which parties are more
polarized on redistribution and place a greater salience on it.10 At the lowest level of politicization
the largest difference in preferences is of 0.217 points between production workers and managers
(statistically significant at p < 0.001), roughly one-fifth of the standard deviation of preferences for
redistribution in the sample. At the highest level of politicization, the largest difference is between
production workers and small business owners and rises to 0.356 points (statistically significant
at p < 0.001). Interestingly, sociocultural professionals remain relatively close to production
and service workers across different political contexts. Contrasts of predicted class preferences
on redistribution (as well as on preferences on immigration, homosexuality and the EU) at low,
medium and high levels of politicization – with confidence intervals – are graphically summarized
in Supporting Information Appendix 7.
The increasing differentiation between social classes along politicization is more marked for
the issue of immigration. Figure 3 summarizes average predicted preferences of the different
classes, with higher values on the Y-axis indicating a more positive stance towards immigration.
This figure depicts a clear fanning out pattern.11 While at the lowest level of politicization the
largest difference between classes is of only 0.122 points (between production workers and
sociocultural professionals and statistically significant at p < 0.001), this difference is more than
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Figure 4. Average predicted preferences on attitudes towards homosexuality along politicization of this issue.
[Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: Estimates from a linear multilevel interactive regression model (with random slopes for social class and
random intercepts for country-round) introducing controls for age, gender, education and union membership. The
coefficients for all variables are presented in model 7 of Supporting Information Appendix 6.
five times larger (0.682 points) when the politicization of immigration is greatest (significant at p <
0.001). Differences in preferences between production and service workers also increase along the
politicization of immigration, but these two classes remain as the two most opposed to immigration
across all contexts.
Following with another issue typically associated with the cultural dimension, Figure 4
depicts the same graphical summary, now for attitudes towards gays and lesbians. Higher values
on the Y-axis indicate more positive attitudes towards homosexuality. These results provide
further support for the proposition that the strength of class discrepancies is dependent on the
politicization of this issue.12 While attitudinal differences between social classes are rather minor
when homosexuals’ rights are not politicized (the maximum difference is of 0.085 between
production workers and managers, statistically significant at p < 0.01), they increase substantively
at high levels of politicization (to 0.218 points, significant at p < 0.001). As with preferences
on immigration, production workers and sociocultural professionals are also located on opposing
poles, and particularly distant at the highest levels of politicization. Whereas for the lowest levels
of politicization, service workers are closest to production workers in terms of preferences, this
changes under greatest politicization, where service workers grow appart from production workers,
and small business owners appear as the class closest to them.
Figure 5 presents social classes’ average predicted preferences for European integration. Higher
values on the Y-axis indicate support for further EU integration. In this case, the figure does
not depict a consistent association between the strength of class divides and the politicization
of European integration.13 In fact, some classes appear slightly more similar in terms of their
preferences at higher levels of politicization. Hence, on this particular issue, the results do not
support the proposition that the greater politicization of issues by parties strengthens class divides.
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Figure 5. Average predicted preferences on European integration along politicization of this issue. [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: Estimates from a linear multilevel interactive regression model (with random slopes for social class and
random intercepts for country-round) introducing controls for age, gender, education and union membership. The
coefficients for all variables are presented in model 8 of Supporting Information Appendix 6.
Across political contexts, classes’ relative placement is in line with previous studies. Managers and
sociocultural professionals are highly supportive of EU integration, in contrast to the opposition
from production and service workers. It is unexpected that small business owners appear more
supportive of integration when this issue is highly politicized, since this class is expected to oppose
EU integration in both economic and cultural terms.
Figure 6 provides another depiction of the results discussed so far. Each of the panels
plots the difference in preferences between two selected classes for each of the issues, along
different levels of politicization. Positive slopes are in line with the expected association between
politicization and class divides. On the issue of redistribution, the upper-left panel plots average
differences between managers and production workers, as the two classes illustrating economic
conflict. The other three panels reflect differences in preferences between production workers
and sociocultural professionals, as the two classes illustrating cultural conflict. Figure 6 displays
clearly the differing pattern of EU integration, in comparison to the other three issues, for which
increases in politicization are associated to greater class divides. Interestingly, the issues of gays’
and lesbians’ rights and, particularly, immigration show great potential for class divides, but this
opposition is more context-dependent than on the issue of redistribution.
The differing pattern for EU integration could be explained by attitudes on this issue being
more fixed (less malleable) than on the other topics. To address this possibility, I take the rate of
non-response and ‘Don’t know’ replies to the different attitudinal items as a proxy for malleability
of attitudes. Since cognitive availability and attitudinal consistency tend to be correlated (Goren
2013), we would expect higher rates of non-response to be indicative of attitudes that are less fixed.
Non-response to the EU integration item is higher than the other issue preferences (as shown in
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Figure 6. Differences in predicted preferences between selected classes along politicization of issues. [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Note: Estimates from linear multilevel interactive regression models (with random slopes for social class and
random intercepts for country-round) introducing controls for age, gender, education and union membership. The
coefficients for all variables are presented in Supporting Information Appendix 6.
Supporting Information Appendix 8), hence indicating that these attitudes should be more open
to change. Thus, the malleability of attitudes does not appear to explain this different pattern. The
next section shows that this difference on EU integration is robust to alternative specifications, and
in the discussion I reflect on further potential explanations for this different result.
Robustness Checks
Because all models are estimated on cross-sectional data, they are limited in that they cannot
identify a causal effect of parties’ politicization of issues on the link between class and preferences.
One could reasonably argue that parties might be able to anticipate potential class differences on
certain issues, and accordingly politicize them. This would imply that it is actually differences in
public opinion between social classes that explain issue politicization. The question of whether
parties lead or follow public opinion has been frequently debated in the political psychology
scholarship (Leeper & Slothuus 2014). Ideally, one would resort to cross-national panel data to
follow individuals’ trajectories on issue preferences, and see how they react to changes in the
supply side. For example, Cavaille and Neundorf (2016) find, for the British case, that partisan
elites’ decisions to polarize on the economy usually precede aggregate attitudinal change as
measured by survey data. However, currently, no cross-national panel data is available to pursue
this approach.
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The current estimations rely on party-level data that was measured in previous years or in
the same year that the ESS was fielded. As a robustness check, I restrict the sample to those
rounds of the ESS that were fielded at least two years after the CHES. This introduces a two-
year lag between the measurement of parties’ and classes’ positions, with politicization temporally
preceding classes’ preferences. These analyses (presented in Supporting Information Appendix 9)
return similar results, although the moderating role of the partisan supply is slightly weaker. These
alternative specifications, however, are not ideal, since the partisan supply should play a role at the
time when preferences are formed, not two years into the future.
Even if the possibilities to address endogeneity are limited by data availability, there are
theoretical grounds to expect that at least part of the moderation found is driven by the partisan
supply. Several experimental and quasi-experimental studies have been able to isolate the causal
effect of parties’ and politicians’ stances on opinion formation (Levendusky 2010; Minozzi
et al. 2015; Petersen et al. 2010; Slothuus & Bisgaard 2020). Moreover, recent literature on
issue competition has emphasized that parties have agency in how they position themselves, and
emphasize or downplay specific issues (Abou-Chadi et al. 2020; Meguid 2005; Meyer & Wagner
2013). Even if parties’ issue positioning faces constraints and incentives generated by other parties’
strategies, public opinion itself, or a party leadership’s own preferences, parties can affect public
opinion, and have agency in deciding how to politicize issues. This gives us confidence in that,
at least part of the moderation found, can be safely attributed to parties’ behaviour. As additional
robustness tests, I also include controls for socioeconomic indicators at the country-round level
to address the possibility that both parties and preferences could be responding to changes in
the countries’ socioeconomic situations. Controls account for economic and social conditions
(unemployment level, poverty rate, Gini index, level of immigration, number of asylum seekers,
and number of immigrants from non-EU countries). These models are presented in Supporting
Information Appendix 10, and indicate that the results commented above are not driven by
differences in objective socioeconomic conditions between countries. The partisan supply still
moderates class differences in preferences in these models.
Moving to the operationalization of politicization, the measure captures both the salience of
an issue and the polarization of parties’ positions around it. The two dimensions are relevant for
public opinion formation, since party cues on policy issues become clearer when party conflict is
intense, and more information is available when conflict is visible. Yet, it is possible that one of
the two dimensions plays a bigger role in affecting individuals’ preferences. That is, that either
the availability of information or the articulation of strongly opposed positions is more important
in this process. For this reason, I also assess the moderating role of polarization and salience
separately. The results of these alternative specifications (included in Supporting Information
Appendices 11 and 12) indicate that, while each factor is associated to class differentiation in
preferences (for the three issues for which this moderation is present in the main analyses), their
separate moderating role is weaker. For the issues of redistribution and attitudes towards gays
and lesbians it appears that the link to salience is weaker than for polarization. Overall, the
results suggest that, as previous literature has argued (Hutter & Grande 2014), politicization is
a multifaceted process, best captured by a composite measure. In the absence of salience, actor
polarization will probably not be evident to a majority of citizens. Similarly, if an issue is visible
but hardly contested, party competition provides little information about alternative positions on
the issue.
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The largest moderating role of the partisan supply appears on two issues typically categorized
as cultural. This could raise questions about whether these class differences are dependent on
the implementation of Oesch’s class scheme, which emphasizes horizontal class differentiation
based on work logic. To address these concerns I replicate the analyses operationalizing class
through EGP’s six-class scheme (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992). Figures 13.A–13.D in Supporting
Information Appendix 13 indicate that the moderating role of the partisan supply is also evident
for class differences along the EGP scheme. On the economic issue, the main opposition is
between workers (skilled and unskilled), and the service class and petty bourgeoisie. On the
issues of immigration and attitudes towards gays and lesbians, the main opposition is between
workers and the service class. These class differences become substantively larger at higher levels
of politicization. This alternative operationalization produces the same lack of moderation in
what concerns European integration. Additional tests also exclude the control for educational
attainment (Supporting Information Appendix 14). Whether to include controls that are likely to
be antecedents of social class (like education) is a topic of debate in class analyses (Knutsen &
Langsæther 2015). Previous studies have sometimes attributed cultural preferences to individuals’
education rather than class (Van de Werfhorst & De Graaf 2004). Moreover, education could also
ground differences in receptiveness towards party messages (Zaller 1992). This is the reason for
including educational attainment as a control in the main analyses. However, results are robust to
excluding education, as well as to including an additional control for political interest (Supporting
Information Appendix 14).
Finally, to make sure that the results are not driven by particular countries, I repeat the
estimations removing one country at a time from the estimation. Supporting Information Appendix
15 replicates Figures 2–5 when each of the countries is excluded. As these plots display, the
patterns described above are robust to excluding individual countries from the analyses.
Discussion
This study brings an important contribution to our understanding of class politics in post-industrial
societies. In line with the main argument, the results document that differences in how social
classes are positioned on relevant issues (like income redistribution, or the rights of immigrants
and homosexuals) depend on the extent to which these issues are politicized by parties. While
earlier literature proposed that the configuration of the electoral supply affects the link between
class and voting, this study identifies another key stage at which the partisan supply intervenes: in
activating or mitigating class opposition in policy preferences. Given that differences in political
values between classes are a relevant mechanism behind class voting (Langsæther 2019), this paper
highlights another point at which parties’ strategic considerations and patterns of competition can
affect class voting. Moreover, it also shows the relevance of going beyond aggregate measures of
ideological differentiation and characterizing the political context in terms of parties’ placement on
and emphasis of concrete issues. On income redistribution, the key divide between the managers
and production workers is magnified under a strong politicization of this issue. Interestingly,
moderation is particularly strong for two of the cultural issues. On the topic of the rights
of immigrants and of homosexuals, the divide between production workers and sociocultural
professionals is mitigated when these issues are hardly contested and emphasized, but divergence
between these classes grows much stronger at high politicization. Hence, while the potential for
class opposition is high, it is strongly context dependent.
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Even if it goes beyond the scope of this study to assess how class issue-opposition is reflected
in electoral behaviour, classes’ average issue placement provides relevant information about social
coalitions that could be mobilized by different parties. Overall, cross-class coalitions (or the ability
of parties to garner support beyond a single-class base) will become increasingly unlikely in
contexts of high issue politicization. For instance, a coalition between sociocultural professionals
and workers is likely with low levels of politicization of the cultural issues of immigration and
homosexuals’ rights, and medium (or even high) levels of politicization of the redistributive
conflict. However, this coalition becomes increasingly unlikely when cultural issues are more
contentious. This would imply that the possibilities for, for example, left-wing parties to cater
jointly to sociocultural professionals and their traditional workers’ base are scarce when cultural
issues are controversial. We find an analogous situation for small business owners and workers,
who display similar cultural preferences on immigration and attitudes towards gays and lesbians,
but diverge on economic preferences, especially under great politicization of this issue. At the
same time, the politicization of EU integration hardly threatens specific class coalitions, since it
does not increase class divides. These are some potential social coalitions suggested by the analyses
of individual issues. Whether and under which conditions these groups can be jointly mobilized
will also depend on the extent to which these different issues are integrated. If issues are highly
integrated or embedded (i.e., not orthogonal to one another) (Kriesi et al. 2006; Whitefield &
Rohrschneider 2019), then classes’ placement on a single issue becomes less informative about
likely social coalitions. As suggested by the literature addressing the integration of international
issues on domestic dimensions of competition, a stronger embedment of issues may sharpen
differences between parties and social groups, decreasing the likelihood that social classes can be
targeted separately on individual topics. Independently of issue integration, an important takeaway
from these analyses is that the potential for classes to align with different parties is likely to
be context-dependent. Future research could address how different configurations of the partisan
supply – characterized by the politicization of different issues – affect the likelihood that certain
parties (e.g., social-democratic) garner support among different classes, and how issue preferences
mediate the link between class and voting across these different contexts.
One of the puzzling results from the analyses is that there is no apparent moderation by the
partisan supply on class differentiation on Europeanization. One possible explanation for this
finding could be that European integration is an issue less closely integrated into the main party
cleavages (Evans & Andersen 2004; but see Whitefield & Rohrschneider 2019). On topics that are
less integrated into the main lines of party competition, party cues to voters tend be weaker and
more infrequent. In their UK-based study, Evans and Andersen (2004) argue that respondents’ EU
positions are less affected by their partisanship, hence indicating that party messages may play a
weaker role on this issue. This could potentially explain the lower impact of parties’ politicization
of EU integration on classes’ opinion differentiation. The lower absolute politicization of this issue
across countries (in comparison to the others, see Supporting Information Appendix 4) would be
in line with this explanation. Interestingly, taking the number of ‘Don’t know’ answers as a sign of
availability and malleability of attitudes indicated that there are more of these answers on the issue
of EU integration, yet these attitudes appear to be less inclined to change (at least in response to
changes in politicization). The lack of moderation could also be explained by differences in how
this issue is politicized across countries specifically, by the extent to which this topic is framed and
politicized on economic or cultural terms. The analyses displayed different key class divides on
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economic and cultural issues. While economic topics oppose production workers to managers and
small business owners, cultural issues divide workers from sociocultural professionals. If European
integration is framed differently across countries, and politicization increases through greater
emphasis on its cultural or economic dimensions, this could reinforce different class divides across
countries. This could confuse differences in preferences, since the measure here implemented asks
about EU integration in general – without separating economy and culture. To disentangle these
two potential explanations, future research could address whether the extent to which EU issues
are integrated into main party cleavages affects the moderating role of the partisan supply; and
rely on measures (of both preferences and party stances) that separate the cultural and economic
dimensions of EU integration.
The evidence here presented is in line with the argument that social classes’ placement on
different issues is context-dependent, and that class issue opposition is stronger when these issues
are strongly politicized by parties. Because the analyses are based on cross-sectional survey data,
they are limited in their ability to isolate the causal effect of the partisan supply on attitudes. Hence,
we must be cautious in interpreting these results as evidence of an effect of politicization. However,
the robustness of the results to different specifications gives us confidence in the association
between issue politicization and class opposition. Moreover, the strategic behaviour by parties
to position themselves and politicize different dimensions of conflict – identified in analyses of
issue competition – and the (quasi-)experimental evidence on the impact of a party’s messages
on public opinion, lend further credibility to the theoretical link between the partisan supply and
classes’ preferences. Yet, parties and their messages are also constrained by structural changes, and
must face transformations to the social composition of their electoral bases. Hence, future research
efforts could be centred around research designs that allow for the identification of partisan effects
on class divides in preferences. These could take the form of experimental treatments subjecting
respondents to different party messages, or quasi-experimental designs identifying stances of
exogenous politicization of an issue. The increased internal validity of these designs might come
at the cost of lower generalizability. However, a growing body of work in this direction would
provide further insight about parties’ role in activating or mitigating class politics.
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Online Appendix
Additional supporting information may be found in the Online Appendix section at the end of the
article:
Appendix 1: Simplified Oesch 8-class scheme with representative professions
Appendix 2: Question wording and descriptive statistics
Appendix 3: Results from a factor analysis of immigration items in the European Social
Survey
Appendix 4: Levels of politicization of redistribution, immigration, homosexuals’ rights and
EU integration across countries and time
Appendix 5: Additive multilevel regression models of issue preferences
Appendix 6: Multilevel regression models with cross-level interactions (estimated with
random slopes for social class)
Appendix 7: Class differences in preferences at low, medium and high levels of issue
politicization
Appendix 8: Non-response and ‘Don’t know’ replies to issue preference items
Appendix 9: Multilevel regression models with cross-level interactions (estimated with
random slopes for social class) restricted to waves 4, 6 and 8 of the European Social Survey
Appendix 10: Multilevel regression models with cross-level interactions and socioeconomic
controls at the country-round level (estimated with random slopes for social class)
Appendix 11: Multilevel regression models with cross-level interactions with issue salience
(estimated with random slopes for social class)1
Appendix 12: Multilevel regression models with cross-level interactions with issue
polarization (estimated with random slopes for social class)2
Appendix 13: Average predicted preferences along politicization by EGP social classes3
Appendix 14: Multilevel regression models with cross-level interactions excluding control for
educational attainment, and including control for political interest (estimated with random
slopes for social class)
Appendix 15: Average predicted preferences along politicization excluding one country from
the estimation4
Appendix 16: Average predicted preferences along politicization of issues (excluding
observations from the 2014 CHES)5
Notes
1. Supporting Information Appendix 1 presents a table summarizing Oesch’s eight-class scheme, with some
typical occupations included in each of the classes.
2. Hutter and Grande (2014) include a third dimension of politicization: the scope of conflict (or actor expansion).
This third dimension, however, makes particular sense in their study on the European Union, an institutional
setting in which a restricted set of actors usually participates in public debates.
3. Since the CHES is conducted every four years (and the ESS every two) the data from one round of the
CHES is used to characterize the partisan supply in two rounds of the ESS. As a robustness test I repeat the
analyses combining data from each CHES wave with only one round of the ESS (4, 6 and 8). These alternative
specifications – included in Supporting Information Appendix 9 – do not alter the conclusions from this paper.
4. A factor analysis of the six items returns a single factor with an eigenvalue higher than 1 and shows that all
variables load strongly on a single dimension (results reported in Supporting Information Appendix 3).
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5. With the exception of the item on EU integration which was excluded from round 5.
6. The 2014 CHES excludes some of the items capturing salience on specific issues. No measure is available
for the salience attributed to redistribution, immigration and social lifestyle. To compute the politicization of
these issues in the 2014 round I rely on: the salience of economic issues in the party’s public stance (for the
politicization of redistribution), and on the salience of libertarian/traditional issues (for the politicization of
immigration and social lifestyle). As a robustness check, I run all models excluding observations from the
2014 CHES to make sure that the results are not affected by this alternative operationalization (results reported
in Supporting Information Appendix 16). The alternative specifications on the reduced sample return similar
results to those discussed below (with the moderating role of the context being slightly stronger).
7. The average salience of all issues within a party system is calculated based on the different issues included in
the rounds of the CHES under consideration.
8. Supporting Information Appendix 2 includes a detailed description of these variables.
9. The main estimates from the model are presented in Supporting Information Appendix 6, model 5.
10. The coefficients for the interactive terms in model 5, Supporting Information Appendix 6, indicate how
the slopes in preferences across politicization differ for each class with respect to production workers. The
interactive terms associated to small business owners and managers are significantly different from production
workers at conventional levels of statistical significance. However, for socio-cultural professionals and service
workers, their slopes in preferences along politicization are not different from that of production workers (for p
< 0.10).
11. The interactive terms of model 6 in Supporting Information Appendix 6 indicate that the slopes of the
association between social class and preferences on immigration across levels of politicization of this issue
differ for all social classes with respect to production workers (all coefficients statistically significant at least at
the 0.01 level).
12. The variation in the slopes of how social class is associated to preferences across different contexts is captured
by the interaction terms presented in model 7, Supporting Information Appendix 6. All coefficients, indicating
differences in slopes with respect to production workers, are statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level,
except for small business owners’.
13. The cross-level interactive terms presented in Model 8, Supporting Information Appendix 6, indicate that
differences in slopes (in the association between social class and preferences for EU integration) with respect
to production workers are not statistically significant (at conventional levels) for any of the social classes.
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